Identifying the Liquidity Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks For a Small Open Economy: Turkey by Berument, Hakan et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Identifying the Liquidity Effects of
Monetary Policy Shocks For a Small
Open Economy: Turkey
Hakan Berument and Selahattin Togay and Afsin Sahin
Bilkent University, Gazi University, Gazi University
September 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46883/
MPRA Paper No. 46883, posted 10. May 2013 06:55 UTC
 1 
 
 
Identifying the Liquidity Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks  
For a Small Open Economy: Turkey 
 
 
 
 
M. Hakan Berument 
Department of Economics 
Bilkent University 
06800 Ankara 
Turkey 
Phone: +90 312 2902342 
Fax: +90 312 2665140 
e-mail: berument@bilkent.edu.tr 
URL: http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~berument 
 
Selahattin Togay 
Department of Economics 
Gazi University 
06500 Ankara 
Turkey 
Phone: +90 312 216 1109 
  Fax: +90 312 2132036 
e-mail: stogay@gazi.edu.tr 
 
 
Afsin Sahin 
Department of Banking 
School of Banking and Insurance   
Gazi University  
06500 Beşevler Campus, Ankara Turkey 
Phone: +90 312 2162116 
Fax: +90 312 2162111 
e-mail:afsinsahin@gazi.edu.tr 
URL: http://websitem.gazi.edu.tr/afsinsahin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Identifying the Liquidity Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks  
For a Small Open Economy: Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  This paper proposes a new liquidity measure for a small open economy. The new 
measure includes the net liquidity provided to the system by a central bank after accounting 
for the central bank’s involvement in the foreign exchange market. Empirical evidence 
gathered from Turkey suggests that a positive innovation in liquidity increases output 
temporarily and that its effect on prices, exchange rate and money are permanently higher.  
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I. Introduction 
A considerable number of studies examine the behavior of business cycles that experience 
exogenous monetary policy shocks. Most of these studies analyze developed countries, 
particularly the United States (see Christiano et al., 1999 and the references cited therein). 
Using similar methodologies for developing countries, however, may not be appropriate. 
Central banks in developing countries may have concerns that extend beyond those in the 
studies and, even if they cannot use them simultaneously, may use additional tools that affect 
their economic performances. Foreign exchange (FX) rates and the foreign exchange reserves 
of a central bank are two of the variables that central banks of developing countries concern 
themselves with. Foreign exchange rates directly affect inflation through higher foreign 
demand for domestic goods or higher input costs.
1
 Moreover, depending on the exchange rate 
regime, expansionary monetary policy shocks may affect economic performance differently. 
Last, the foreign exchange rate regime itself could be considered part of a country’s monetary 
policy.  
In the literature, using the funding of central banks through open market operations to 
the markets—non-borrowed reserves (NBR)—as an indicator of monetary policy is common. 
Again, most of the studies have been done on the US economy (see for example Rudebush, 
1998; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992b; Christiano, 1995; Eichenbaum, 1992; Bernanke 
and Mihov; 1998, Bernanke and Blinder; 1992, Strongin, 1995; Pagan and Robinson, 1995 
and Thornton, 2001). Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992b) and Pagan and Robinson (1995) 
find evidence that positive shocks to NBR decrease short-term interest rates. Strongin (1995) 
proposes to use the non-borrowed reserves’ growth to identify monetary policy disturbances. 
However, a limited number of studies use NBR as a stance of monetary policy for developed 
countries other than the US; for Japan, see for example Kasa and Popper (1997) and Shioji 
(2000).   
Vector autoregression (VAR) models are the most common econometric method used 
to assess the effect of monetary policy changes on economic performance. Innovations to 
money aggregates were the variables used to measure monetary policy initially (see Sims 
1972; Stock and Watson, 1989 and Rotemberg, Driscoll and Poterba, 1995). Christiano and 
Eichenbaum (1992a) claim that innovations to broad money aggregates reflect shocks to 
money demand rather than money supply. Friedman and Kuttner (1992) also argue that this 
relationship is not stable. The second variable considered was innovations to the interest rate 
                                                 
1
 Kamin and Rogers (2000) provide an excellent survey on the possible effects of foreign exchange movements 
on economic performance.  
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(see Bernanke and Blinder, 1992 and Sims, 1992). This variable is often associated with a set 
of empirical puzzles, such as the price puzzle (positive interest rate shocks are associated with 
higher rather than lower prices) and the exchange rate puzzle (positive interest rate shocks are 
associated with depreciating rather than appreciating currency).  
The spread between short-term interest rates and other financial variables is also 
considered as a measure of monetary policy. In the literature, several studies use short-
term/long-term interest rate spreads, and consider the term structure of interest rates as an 
indicator of monetary policy stance (see also Mankiw and Miron, 1986 for the predictive 
power of this spread illustration). More specifically, Bernanke (1990) calculates the spread as 
the difference between commercial paper and a Treasury bill, Laurent (1988) considers the 
spread between the 20-year Treasury bill’s constant maturity and the federal funds rate, and 
McCallum (2005) considers the difference between yields on one-period and two-period (long 
rate) bonds in general. Berument (2007) examines the short-term interest rate and the 
depreciation rate spread as a measure of monetary policy for Turkey.  
The fourth variable, non-borrowed reserves, is the remainder of total reserves when 
borrowed reserves are subtracted, and is used in identifying monetary policy. The non-
borrowed reserves variable is a narrower monetary aggregate, and compared to the broader 
monetary aggregates, has some advantages in measuring the stance of monetary policy and in 
identifying monetary policy disturbances. When broader monetary aggregates are used to 
measure exogenous policy disturbances, some traditional and common technical sovereignty 
problems arise. First, central banks cannot control the broader monetary aggregates such as 
M1 and M2. Second, the broader monetary aggregates are the measures of liquidity and are 
affected by the state of the economy as well as by the country’s monetary policy. Non-
borrowed reserves is a more controllable variable when the standard definition given by the 
Federal Reserve System is considered. (We elaborate on the calculation equivalent of NBR 
for developing countries in the following sections.)  
Buying (or selling) foreign exchanges injects (ejects) liquidity into (or from) the 
markets; any study that assesses the monetary policy stance for a small open economy needs 
to account for the liquidity provided by the foreign exchange transactions of central banks.  
The contribution of this paper to the literature is to generate a monetary policy measure that 
accounts for foreign exchange transactions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other 
study that develops a liquidity measure that accounts for the foreign exchange transactions for 
any developing country. Our variable, as we will discuss in the next section, will assess how 
the liquidity provided to markets as determined both by open-market operations and foreign 
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exchange markets where the latter is not explicitly accounted for in the conventional non-
borrowed reserves definition affects the economic performance.  
We define and assess the role of the new liquidity measure for Turkey. There are 
various reasons for gathering data from Turkey. First of all, the Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey (CBRT) has always been actively involved in the foreign exchange market and the 
money markets.
2
 This is not the case with all developing countries; some have fixed exchange 
rates or an orthodox currency board regime where, when central banks buy foreign exchange, 
they passively generate liquidity in domestic currency. Second, the average annual consumer 
price inflation rate for the sample we consider is 51.2%, and Turkey is the only country that 
has had high inflation for more than three decades without running hyper inflation. Higher 
levels of inflation, and financial variables such as interest rates and exchange rates, make the 
relationship between monetary policy variables and macroeconomic variables more visible, 
therefore detecting these relationships will be easier. In other words, the Type II Error (the 
probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false) is lower. Third, Turkey has 
had well-developed, well-functioning and liberal financial markets; prices determined in these 
markets are therefore representative of the relative scarcity of financial assets rather than as 
the act of a few manipulators. These three conditions make Turkey a unique (developing) 
small open economy for which to assess the role of financial variables on economic variables.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: The next section (Section II) elaborates on the 
liquidity measure that the paper uses. Section III introduces the methodology. Section IV 
discusses the development of Turkey’s monetary policy by using the liquidity introduced in 
Section III. Section V discusses the effects of a loose monetary policy. The last section 
summarizes and concludes.    
 
II. A Liquidity Measure for Small Open Economies 
Innovations in non-borrowed reserves is one of the monetary policy measures followed by US 
economic policy participants.  NBR is calculated as the difference between a banking 
system’s total reserves (TR) and its borrowed reserves, and the ratio of NBR to TR is taken as 
a liquidity measure. However, innovations in this ratio may not be appropriate as monetary 
policy changes for a small open economy that has an incentive to intervene in the foreign 
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 See Berument (2007) for the CBRT’s monetary policy practice. Turkey did not fix its exchange rate, and the 
only exception for Turkey is that it had a crawling peg exchange rate regime for the period from January 2000 to 
February 2001. As this is a brief amount of time, we did not explicitly address it.  For the remaining period, the 
CBRT was either an active participant on the foreign exchange market or it made its preferences known to the 
public such that it could enter the market when it desired. 
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exchange market to stabilize its foreign exchange volatilities as well as to use the foreign 
exchange market for controlling liquidity in the markets. There might be various reasons for 
these decisions. For example, buying foreign exchange in local currency, which increases 
liquidity in the markets, decreases the NBR-to-TR ratio; buying foreign exchange does not 
change NBR but increases TR. An additional problem arises if the central bank desires to 
sterilize excess liquidity that is provided by buying foreign exchange. In the next stage, as the 
central bank sells treasury securities for decreasing the pressure on the markets (open-market 
operations), NBR further decreases. Since the latter option does decrease NBR under 
incomplete sterilization (when purchases of treasuries do not match with foreign exchange 
buys) the NBR-to-TR ratio further decreases rather than increases. Thus, increase in liquidity 
suggests a decrease in the NBR-to-TR ratio rather than an increase: this is a problem. We 
therefore offer a new appropriate measure of monetary policy that incorporates the foreign 
exchange market operations of central banks.   
The developments in the Turkish economy also suggest that the NBR-to-TR ratio is 
not an appropriate measure of monetary policy stance. During the period of 1990 to 1997, the 
CBRT openly encouraged the banking sector to undertake involved transactions with each 
other rather than receive liquidity from the CBRT; the borrowed reserves then diminished 
continuously and NBR increased.  In this period, the CBRT also continued to accumulate its 
foreign exchange reserves; this let liquidity in the system diminish. As we will discuss below 
and as noted in Berument (2007), this period was an era of tight monetary policy (except for 
few instances) and, excluding the role of the foreign exchange markets, lets us draw 
misleading conclusions. Moreover, in the post-February 2000 era, the Borrowed Reserve-to-
TR ratio has diminished to a level we can disregard and for this reason, as seen in Figure 1, 
the NBR-to-TR ratio converges to a constant number and its limit is 1. This situation lets the 
NBR-to-TR ratio give an unhealthy signal concerning the development of market liquidity in 
different economic conjectures. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the explanatory 
power of the NBR-to-TR ratio to be low for any macroeconomic variable that we consider. 
In this study, we propose a new liquidity measure calculated from the CBRT’s 
analytical balance sheet. To this end, we first define the central bank’s Foreign Currency 
Operations (CT) item. According to this, CT is the difference between the Central Bank 
Money (CBM) and the Cash Operations (CO). In addition, to reach the liquidity provided by 
the CBRT in the market, we subtract the Open Market Operations (OM) from the Foreign 
Currency Operations (CT), then we divide this difference by Total Reserves (TR) to obtain 
the liquidity measure. To obtain the TR size, we classify the entries on the CBRT balance 
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sheet into three groups: Autonomous factors (A), monetary policy operations (M+B) and 
reserves of banks. To be specific, by following Bindsell (2004), where the total reserve size is 
calculated as TR = OM+B+A (M being open-market operations, B being borrowed reserve 
and A being autonomous factors), it follows that NBR = OM+A. The net autonomous factors 
in Turkey are positive, therefore we consider A as a positive variable in the equation. Thus, 
our liquidity measure L can be defined as:  
  
         
     
 
(The sources, definitions and calculations of all the data are provided in Table 2). 
The plot of the new liquidity measure is provided in Figure 2. We could deflate the 
nominator with an aggregate that also includes the total foreign exchange reserves of the 
CBRT. Turkey had signed four standby agreements with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for the period that we consider. These agreements involved various installments in 
foreign currency (SDR).  Moreover, Turkey had an ambitious privatization program where the 
payments were made mostly in US dollars. Once these two types of payments were made, 
foreign exchange reserves of the CBRT changed. Since determining when these payments 
were made is not easy to trace, we did not include a measure of foreign reserves in the 
denominator. Moreover, including foreign exchange reserve changes without accounting for 
the dates of these events may give a signal of tight monetary policy even if the stance of the 
monetary policy is intact. Thus, we did not incorporate the total foreign exchange reserves in 
the denominator. 
 
III. Methodology 
Identifying the effects of monetary policy on economic performance is not a simple task 
because the actions of a central bank are determined by the state of the economy as well as by 
the bank’s monetary policy. In order to capture the effect of the central bank’s monetary 
setting, identifying the variables that the central bank is not reacting to is important. By 
following Christiano et al. (1999) and the references cited therein, we specify a VAR model 
to capture that part of the monetary policy. Here, we consider the liquidity-to-TR ratio as the 
central bank’s policy variable. 
The variables that we include to the VAR specification are income (y), prices (p), 
liquidity/total reserves ratio (L), exchange rate (exchange) as defined by the Turkish lira value 
of the US dollar, the interbank interest rate (interbank) and money (m). We use industrial 
production as a measure of income and the wholesale price index for prices. There are two 
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reasons for this decision: i. In the majority of the sample, the CBRT used the wholesale price 
index as an inflation measure. ii. Industrial production is more likely to move with the 
wholesale price index than the consumer price index. Money is M1. We gathered all the data 
from the CBRT’s electronic data delivery system covering the monthly period from 1987:01 
to 2008:04. 
In order to identify monetary policy shocks, the order of the variables in the VAR 
setting are income ( ty ), prices ( tp ), liquidity/total reserves ratio ( tL ), exchange rate 
(exchanget), the interbank interest rate (interbank) and money ( tm ). All the variables enter to 
the specification in their logarithmic levels except for L and the interbank rate.
3
  However, 
similar to Cook (1999), Kim (2001), Kim (2003), Jang and Ogaki (2004) and Scholl and 
Uhlig (2008), liquidity enters as a ratio to total reserves. This ordering scheme is consistent 
with our basic identification assumption that monetary policy does not have any 
contemporaneous effect on income and prices but income and prices do affect the central 
bank’s policy stance. This ordering incorporates the extreme information assumption: that 
policy makers know the current levels of income and prices. Quarterly data may be used, but 
when we do this we also assume that monetary policy shocks do not affect income and prices 
in the current period; this may not be true. Using the assumption that monetary policy does 
not affect income and prices is more reasonable for monthly data than for quarterly data. 
Moreover, it is also reasonable to assume that the central bank sets its monetary policy 
monthly rather than quarterly. And as the data span available is so narrow for Turkey, this is 
another reason for using monthly data instead of quarterly data for our analyses. Further, 
Geweke and Runkbel (1995), Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano et al. (1999) also 
suggest that the inferences gathered from quarterly data are in line with monthly data.  
Ordering L before the interbank interest rate suggests that the interbank interest rate 
responds to L contemporaneously. This is a valid assumption if we take L as a measure of 
monetary policy. Later in the paper, we will also consider that the interbank rate (or the 
spread between the interbank rate and the exchange rate depreciation) may be used as a policy 
tool for central banks. Thus, if one takes the interbank rate as an indicator of monetary policy, 
the interbank rate should precede L (see Strongin, 1995 for discussion). Ordering exchange 
rate before spread goes along with the practices of the central bank before 2001 (see 
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 Faust, Swanson and Jonathan (2004), Hanson (2006), Normandin and Phaneuf (2004), Uhlig (2005), Silva 
(2008), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Croushore and Evans 
(2006) use NBR in its logarithmic form. Since NBR may take negative values, we enter liquidity measure as its 
ratio to TR, rather than in its logarithmic form.  
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Berument, 2007 for this discussion). Since 2001, and particularly since 2003, Turkish 
exchange rate movements are mostly driven by world (excess) liquidity than by the actions of 
the CBRT.  The CBRT often argued that due to the inflation target regime that they had, they 
could not set up the monetary policy to affect the exchange rate, and setting up the exchange 
rate during the appreciation period that Turkey experienced would have threatened their target 
inflation (see CBRT, 2007 for details.)  
The lag order of the VAR specification is 2, as determined both by the Schwartz and 
Hannan-Quinn information criteria. When the VAR model is estimated to account for 
seasonality, twelve monthly dummies are included; in order to account for the April 1994 
financial crisis, we include dummies for April and May of 1994. In order to account for the 
November 2000 and February 2001 crises, we include two additional dummy variables.   
 
IV. Developments of Monetary Policy 
In this section, before we assess the effects of monetary policy shocks on economic 
performance, we will discuss the stance of monetary policy by considering the specification 
that we use in this paper, and elaborate on it by considering the developments of the perceived 
monetary policy stance. Figure 3 plots the accumulated liquidity innovations; downward 
movement in the figure represents tight monetary policy and upward movement represents 
loose monetary policy. Thus, we will be able to elaborate on the stance of monetary policy by 
looking at the graph as suggested by our specification.  
Overall, the implied monetary policy from Figure 3 matches with the announced (or 
perceived) monetary policy stance. For the period from 1987:03 to 1988:06, monetary policy 
seems to be tight; this is when Turkey adopted its first monetary program. The program was 
not announced to the public, and its main concept was based upon a monetarist framework: 
the CBRT had tried to control the M2 monetary aggregate (Kumcu et al., 1987). The program 
was discontinued one year later due to political pressure on the government regarding election 
timing. Loose monetary policy can be seen for the following six months, from June 1988 to 
December 1988 (A referendum regarding rescheduling local election timing was held on 
September 25, 1988.)  The loose monetary policy ended with increasing pressure on the 
economic system that led to dollarization of the system, which ultimately led, in February 
1989, to Turkey adopting a set of codes that is associated with tight monetary policy.    
Tight monetary policy continued until August 1989. Capital flow controls had been 
abandoned and the Turkish lira was made convertible with major world currencies in August 
1989 with the adaptation of Code 32. This encouraged foreign capital inflow for portfolio 
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investments. The effect of capital inflows on CBRT reserves mimicked itself with higher 
money supply. The effect of this as loose monetary policy can be detected from Figure 3 for 
the period from 1989:10 to 1992:01.  
In January 1992, after the pressure of the First Gulf War eased for Turkey, the CBRT 
announced its new monetary program.  Although CBRT’s monetary targets were not achieved 
at all later in that year, this program is considered the beginning of Turkey’s tight monetary 
policy (see Figure 3). Five years later, the Asian crisis that began in July 1997 put pressure on 
the Turkish government to loosen its monetary policy. Further, political turmoil that led to 
Turkey’s prime minister resigning in June 1997 and a new prime minister being 
“implemented” increased pressure on the government to adopt populist policies.  These 
factors contributed to loose monetary policy for the period from 1997:07 to 2000:07. 
Turkey adopted an exchange-based stabilization program in December 1999 to start 
January 2000.  Due to its nature, this program was expansionary in its early stages (see 
Agénor and Montiel, 1999, for details). Parallel to this, a loose policy stance can be observed 
from Figure 3.  The highest liquidity is observed in July 2000.  A higher current account 
deficit put pressure on the CBRT’s reserves and the lower liquidity associated with it 
mimicked itself with tight policy in the later stages of the exchange-based stabilization 
program. When we look through the period from 2000:07 to 2006:07, we observe that 
monetary policy was tight.  This stance of tightness was evident in that the CBRT had had 
implicit inflation targeting and realized inflation rates that were lower than the announced 
targeted levels for the years 2004 and 2005. 
A new CBRT president was appointed in April 2006.  Financial markets were 
turbulent in May 2006 and the turbulence continued until June.  During this period, it seems 
that the CBRT, parallel to the signed IMF agreement, had a tight monetary policy.
4
  Figure 3 
shows higher inflation after July 2006, which suggests that the stance of tight monetary policy 
had eased.  Realized inflation rates were higher than the publicly announced target rates for 
2006, 2007 and 2008.  
 
V. Empirical Evidence  
In this section, we will assess the effects of change in monetary policy by using the 
specification introduced in Section III. It is expected that expansionary monetary policy is 
                                                 
4
 A former CBRT vice president who left his position in March 2006 (the CBRT has four vice-president 
positions) acknowledged in his column in a daily newspaper in June 2006 that the monetary policy was still tight 
(see Ozatay, 2006).  
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associated with initially lower interest rates, a higher exchange rate (depreciation) and higher 
monetary aggregates. Interest rates may later increase due to inflationary and exchange rate 
pressures. Moreover, with loose monetary policy, prices rise and there should be no decrease 
in output level. It is also plausible that loose monetary policy is associated with higher output 
levels.  
The impulse responses of the six macroeconomic variables when a one-standard-
deviation shock is given to each L and interbank interest rate for 24 periods are reported in 
Figure 4. The first column of Figure 4 reports the effect of a one-standard-deviation shock to 
L for output, prices, exchange rate, L, interbank and money. The middle line shows the point 
estimates, the other two lines are plus and minus one-standard-error confidence intervals.
5
 
Taking a one-standard-error confidence band is in line with Sims and Zha (1999) and Shioji 
(2000).  They claim that taking the confidence band higher than one standard error is too 
restrictive for testing corresponding hypotheses.  
Evidence suggests that a one-standard-deviation shock to L increased output for five 
periods and this increase is statistically significant for the first two periods.  The hump shape 
of the output’s response is parallel to empirical evidence from the US (Christiano et al., 1999) 
and from Turkey (Berument, 2007). Prices also tended to accelerate. Prices stabilized after 
about eight months and this effect is statistically significant for the time horizon that we 
consider. A positive shock to L increased the exchange rate for six periods, and even when the 
exchange rate decreased from its peak, it remained higher for the period that we consider; this 
effect is persistent and statistically significant. A shock to L is not persistent. A higher L is 
associated with lower interest rates initially, but even with an increase in interest rates after 
the second period this effect is not statistically significant.  The last row reports the impulses 
for money.  Money aggregates increase and remain high for the 24 periods that we consider.  
The effect is statistically significant for the whole period but contemporaneously. Thus, lower 
interest rates associated with a positive innovation in L suggest that we do not have the 
liquidity puzzle (see Carpenter and Demiralp, 2008, and literature cited therein for the 
liquidity puzzle). These empirical findings on six macroeconomic variables are in line with 
economic theory and parallel to existing empirical studies such as Strongin (1995), 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Christiano et al. (1999). 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992) suggest using innovations in short-term 
interest rates to capture the stance of monetary policy. The second column of Figure 4 reports 
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 In order to calculate the confidence bands we used the Monte Carlo method with 1000 iterations by using the 
MALCOLM procedure for RATS (see Mosconi, 1998).  
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the impulse responses when a one-standard-deviation shock is given to the interbank interest 
rate. When we order the variables in the VAR, interbank rate is ordered before the liquidity 
measure. This re-ordering implies that interest rate (as a monetary policy variable here) 
affects L but is not affected by L contemporaneously.  This goes with the spirit of identifying 
monetary policy as we discussed in Section III.  A positive innovation in interbank rate 
decreases output, decreases L and decreases money (at least initially). These are parallel to 
economic theory. However, positive innovation in interbank interest rate increases prices and 
exchange rates. These are two well-known phenomena and are named price and exchange 
puzzles in the literature (see Kim and Roubini, 2000 for discussion of this issue.)  Thus, we 
may take the existence of these two puzzles as not  innovations in interest rates, but 
innovations in L can be taken as an indicator of monetary policy changes.  
In order to more comprehensively assess the theoretical consistency of the dynamic 
interactions among the variables in our VAR set up, we report how the innovations of six 
variables affect the variables themselves. These 36 (6 x 6) impulse responses are reported in 
Figure A1 of the Appendix. The effect of positive exchange rate innovation decreases output 
and increases prices and interest rate. These are parallel to earlier empirical evidence. Higher 
exchange rate lowers output due to higher input prices and wage demands (see for example 
Kamin and Rogers, 2000; Berument and Pasaogullari, 2003 and Sahin, 2009). A higher price 
is due to exchange-rate-pass-through and a higher interest rate due to uncovered interest rate 
parity conditions. 
 Empirical evidence on other variables is also in line with the workings of the Turkish 
economy. The Turkish Central Bank has a low level of independence from the government 
(see Cukierman, 1992 and Berument and Neyapti, 1999). Moreover, the CBRT often pursues 
accommodative monetary policies (Berument and Tasci, 2004). In that spirit, our estimates 
are in line with expectations. In order to see how the various types of shocks affect L, the 
evidence suggests that a positive shock to prices initially decreases liquidity (not significantly 
and it later increases L). Higher L suggests existence of the accommodative policies of the 
CBRT; moreover, a shock to money increases liquidity provided by the central bank to 
accommodate the markets. The initial response of L to interbank rate shock is negative, which 
is parallel to Croushore and Evans (2006, Figure 2). The increase in interest rate is associated 
with lower liquidity. However, it seems that liquidity does not respond to exchange rate and 
output. These are all parallel with earlier literature on Turkey. Berument and Tasci (2004) 
argue that the CBRT does not respond to exchange rate and output movements in a 
statistically significant fashion but does monitor the foreign exchange reserves. Higher 
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foreign exchange rates are associated with higher demand in the foreign exchange market 
(that mimics itself with higher overnight interest rates) because the CBRT decreases the 
liquidity to deplete FX demands from its inflated levels under excess FX demands. (See a 
discussion on this issue from a former vice president of the CBRT, Şükrü Binay, in Aydogdu 
and Yonezer, 2007). 
Berument (2007) uses the spread between the interbank rate and monthly depreciation 
rate of the Turkish lira as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy for Turkey.  He 
considers the period between 1986 and 1999, when the daily depreciation rate volatility was 
zero in each month, even if the depreciation rate for each month was not known a priori. We 
did not consider spread as a measure of monetary policy stance because the daily depreciation 
volatility within a month is not zero after 2001. Nevertheless, we repeat the exercise with 
spread by replacing it with interest rates. These impulse responses are reported in Figure 5. 
Parallel to Figure 4, the first column reports the impulses when a one-standard-deviation 
shock is given to L, and the second column reports on the spread with reordered VAR 
variables. When we compare the first columns of Figures 4 and 5, a one-standard-deviation 
shock to L decreases spread in Figure 5 and increases the interbank rate in Figure 4. This may 
suggest that the interbank rate decreases more than the exchange rate depreciates. The 
estimates on innovations in the interbank rate (Column 2 of Figure 4) and innovations in 
spread (Column 2 of Figure 5) are parallel, including existing puzzles. Innovation in spread 
increases prices and depreciates local currencies. Thus, using spread for the post-2001 era 
exhibits both price and exchange rate puzzles. We may therefore claim innovations in L 
capture the effects of monetary policy changes better than innovations in spread. A set of 
analyses regarding robustness of the results are presented in the following sub-sections.    
 
V.1 Evidence from Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
The impulse response functions capture the dynamic effects of various shocks. On the other 
hand, forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis captures how shocks contribute 
to the volatility of various economic aggregates.  There are two reasons for looking at the 
effects of monetary policy shocks using FEVDs. First, FEVDs help to assess whether 
monetary policy shocks as identified have been an important independent source of impulses 
for economic performance. Second, the method helps to define the identification strategy, 
which assumes that changes in monetary policy stance are mostly exogenous shocks to the 
system. 
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Table 1 reports the first 6, 12, 24, 30, 36, 42 and 48 step-ahead forecast error variances 
decompositions in income (y), prices (p), exchange rate (exchange), liquidity (L), interbank 
interest rates (interbank) and money (m) as the percentage of variances, which are attributable 
to liquidity. Regarding the effect of liquidity on income, it does not have a statistically 
significant explanatory power, which is parallel to Kim (1999), Kim and Roubini (2000) and 
Berument (2007). Moreover, there is no statistically significant variation in prices accounted 
for by liquidity. Importantly, a large variation of liquidity is also explained by itself. This 
supports the identification strategy, which assumes that innovations in liquidity are exogenous 
to the system and thus not explained by prices and output.  This exogeneity in L innovations 
can be taken to mean that L innovations are an indicator of monetary policy changes.  
 
V.2 Evidence from Different Sub-samples 
In order to assess the validity of our specifications, we repeat the exercise for different sub-
samples.  First, similar to Berument (2007), we end our sample in 2000:10 and use spread 
rather than interbank interest rate in the VAR specification for a comparison.  Figure 6 reports 
the impulse responses for the two specifications that we considered earlier.  The first column 
of Figure 6 considers liquidity as a policy tool and reports how the six variables respond to a 
one-standard-deviation shock to L. The order of the variables is y, p, exchange, L, spread and 
m in the VAR system. The second column of Figure 6 orders the variables such that spread is 
the policy tool.  To be specific, the order of the variables is y, p, exchange, spread, L and m. A 
positive innovation in L (loose monetary policy) is associated with higher output, prices and 
money. On the other hand, the initial decrease in exchange rate is small but statistically 
significant, and the initial spread increase is also not statistically significant. When spread is 
the indicator of the policy, the estimates on the second column are mostly parallel to 
Berument (2007). Thus, even if L innovation captures the stance of monetary policy to a 
degree, evidence suggests that innovations in spread are a superior indicator of the stance of 
monetary policy than the innovation in L for the pre-2000:10 era.  
 Figure 7 repeats the same exercise for the period from 2001:10 to 2008:04. During this 
period the exchange rate depreciation was not constant on any day on any given month, so 
Berument’s (2007) identification of monetary policy is not valid. The impulse responses for 
our benchmark specification are reported in the first column. The estimates are robust to our 
benchmark specification. The second column reports the impulse response with Berument’s 
(2007) identification scheme. The latter suggests that prices increase with positive spread 
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innovations.  Even if price increase is not statistically significant, the price puzzle is present.
6
 
Therefore,  one may argue that even if Berument’s (2007) specification does not capture the 
stance of monetary policy with the innovations in spread for the post-2001 era, our 
identification scheme is valid for both periods. 
 After the Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998, the liquidity measure that 
we had had a high volatility. In order to partially address this, we estimate the model prior to 
the Asian crisis. To be specific, we estimate the specification until 1997:06. In this particular 
specification, following Berument (2007), we use M1 + Repo as the money aggregate.
7
 The 
estimates are reported in Figure 8. The effect of positive innovation in L is to increase income, 
prices and money but decrease interbank rate and exchange rate. These results are parallel to 
our benchmark specification on L as reported in Figure 4 but for exchange rate. Our estimates 
for the pre-Asian-crisis period reveal appreciation rather than depreciations. This period needs 
to be taken causesly because during this period exchange rate is also used as a monetary 
policy tool (see Berument, 2007 for details) and lower exchange rate captures the loose 
monetary policy that goes with higher L.    
 
V.3. Evidence with the Reordered Variables  
The impulse response functions are sensitive to the identification scheme. To be specific, in 
the Cholesky decomposition, the impulse responses are sensitive to the ordering of the 
variables. In order to assess the robustness of our results, we repeat the exercise with a more 
flexible identification scheme where we have a non-recursive short-term identification 
restriction for the VAR system. The impulse responses are reported in Figure 9. With the L 
innovations the estimates, similar to our benchmark specification, for output increase 
temporarily, and prices, money, as well as exchange rate, increase permanently. Here interest 
rate, unlike the benchmark specification, increases, but as in the benchmark specification, this 
effect is statistically insignificant. As elaborated on in the literature, some use positive 
interbank rate innovation as an indicator of tight monetary policy. Even if estimates of an 
output are parallel to benchmark specifications, the estimates reveal that the effect of a 
positive interest rate innovation results in the price puzzle (higher prices) and the exchange 
                                                 
6 For this specification, Consumer Price Indexes (CPI) rather than Wholesale Price Indexes (WPI) areused as a 
measure of prices, where governments use CPI for their budgeting. The CBRT also announced CPI-based 
inflation targets during the era of explicit and implicit inflation targeting.  Moreover, the lag order of the VAR 
system is 1 rather than 2 for our specification. Even if the impulse responses are similar, confidence bands are 
narrower with a lag order of 1.   
 
7
 When we use M1 as the money aggregate the results are mostly the same but the effect of L on Y is statistically 
significant just for two periods. 
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rate puzzle (with higher exchange rate); moreover, a positive shock on interest rate increases 
rather than decreases money aggregate. Thus, we safely claim that our identification of the 
monetary policy tool with L innovation is robust and identifying monetary policy with interest 
rate innovations is still problematic and reveals that puzzles persist.   
 
Table 1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: How L Explains Each Variable 
 ,y ,p exchange L interbank ,m 
6 0.15 1.38 0.01 95.65
**
 0.15 2.66 
 (0.32) (1.99) (2.34) (1.09) (1.09) (3.27) 
12 0.19 1.40 0.03 95.56
**
 0.15 2.66 
 (0.27) (3.05) (3.35) (1.17) (0.94) (4.15) 
18 0.20 1.41 0.06 95.52
**
 0.15 2.66 
 (0.50) (3.21) (3.46) (1.23) (0.86) (4.34) 
24 0.20 1.41 0.08 95.49
**
 0.15 2.66 
 (0.63) (3.18) (3.38) (1.26) (0.81) (4.20) 
30 0.20 1.41 0.10 95.48
**
 0.15 2.66 
 (0.69) (3.11) (3.27) (1.28) (0.78) (3.87) 
36 0.20 1.41 0.10 95.47
**
 0.15 2.66 
 (0.71) (3.03) (3.15) (1.30) (0.76) (3.50) 
42 0.20 1.41 0.11 95.46
**
 0.15 2.66 
 (0.71) (2.96) (3.05) (1.31) (0.75) (3.19) 
48 0.20 1.41 0.11 95.46
**
 0.15 2.66 
 (0.69) (2.89) (2.95) (1.31) (0.74) (2.97) 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses under the corresponding coefficients.  
** 
Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a new liquidity measure for small open economies.  Central banks of 
small open economies use the exchange rate market along with the money markets to stabilize 
their economies.  Therefore, any measure of the stance of monetary policy should consider the 
developments in foreign exchange markets along with money markets. The contribution of 
this paper to the literature is to generate a liquidity measure of monetary policy that accounts 
for central banks’ foreign exchange transactions along with their money markets transactions. 
A new liquidity measure is calculated from the analytical balance sheet of the Central Bank of 
the Republic of Turkey by considering both the Turkish lira value of foreign exchange 
transactions and open-market operations. The empirical evidence gathered from Turkey 
reveals that loose monetary policy (a positive innovation in liquidity) has a transitory effect 
on output, and a permanent effect on prices, exchange rate and money. The qualitative 
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inferences gathered here are parallel to previous findings of Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1992), Sims (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Berument (2007).  
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Figure 1: Non-borrowed Reserves in Turkey (1986:01-2008:04) 
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Figure 2: (Currency Transactions - Open-Market Operations)/R  
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Figure 3:  The Implied Stance of Monetary Policy: Accumulated Summation of L Innovations 
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Figure 4: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Interest Rates 
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Figure 4: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Interest Rates (cont.) 
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Figure 4: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Interest Rates (cont.) 
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Figure 5: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Spread Rates 
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Figure 5: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Spread Rates (cont.) 
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Figure 5: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Spread Rates (cont.) 
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Figure 6: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Spread Rates for the 1987:01-1997:06 Period 
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Figure 6: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Spread Rates for the 1987:01-1997:06 Period 
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Figure 6: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Spread Rates for the 1987:01-1997:06 Period (cont.) 
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Figure 7: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Spread Rates for the 2001:03-2008:04 Period  
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Figure 7: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Spread Rates for the 2001:03-2008:04 Period (cont.) 
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Figure 7: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Spread Rates for the 2001:03-2008:04 Period (cont.) 
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Figure 8: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Interbank Rates  
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Figure 8: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Interbank Rates (cont.) 
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Figure 8: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Interbank Rates (cont.) 
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Figure 9: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Interbank Rates  
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Figure 9: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Interbank Rates (cont.) 
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Figure 9: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Economic Performance with Interbank Rates (cont.) 
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Table 2: Data Definitions and Sources 
Variable Name Symbol Description Source Code 
Income Y Industrial Production Index, Total Industry 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.TSY01 
Price P Wholesale Price Index, General 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.FG.TF01.2 
Central Bank Money CBM 
Central Bank Money obtained from Central Bank 
Analytic Balance Sheet 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A15.1: P.2 
Cash Operations CO 
Cash Operations obtained from Central Bank 
Analytical Balance Sheet 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A04.1: A.2-a 
Currency Transactions CT CBM-CO Our Calculation  
Foreign Assets FA Foreign Assets 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A02: A.1 
Domestic Assets DO Domestic Assets 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A03: A.2 
Credits to Banking Sector B Credits to Banking Sector 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A06: A.2-ab 
Total Foreign Liabilities TFL Total Foreign Liabilities 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A10: P.1 
FX Deposits from Banking 
Sector 
FXDBS FX Deposits from Banking Sector 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A14: P.1-bb 
Currency Issued CI Currency Issued 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A17: P.2-Aa 
Extra-budgetary Funds EF Extra-budgetary Funds 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A21: P.2-Ac 
Deposits from Non-Bank 
Sector 
DNBS Deposits from Non-Bank Sector 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A22: P.2-Ad 
Open-Market Operations OM Open-Market Operations 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A24: P.2-Ba 
YTL Deposits from Public 
Sector 
YDPS YTL Deposits from Public Sector 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.AB.A25: P.2-Bb 
A A (FA+DO-B)-(TFL-FXDBS+CI+EF+DNBS+YDPS) Our Calculation  
TR TR A+B+OM Our Calculation  
Interbank Rate Interbank 
Simple Interest Rate Weighted Average (%) 
(Overnight) 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.PY.P06.ON.1 
Spread Spread 
Spread between the Interbank Rate and Daily 
Depreciation of Exchange Rate 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
 
 44 
M1 M M1 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.PR.ARZ01 
Repo Repo Repo 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.PG.B07 
Money M1R M1+Repo Our Calculation  
Liquidity Measure   L (CT-M)/TR Our Calculation  
US Exchange Rate US Exchange Rate TL value of 1 US Dollar (buying) 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.DK.USD.A.1  
EUR Exchange Rate EUR TL value of 1 Euro (buying) 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey 
TP.DK.EUR.A.1 
Exchange Rate  
Exchange Rate  of 
the Basket 
TL value of 1 US dollar + 0.77 Euro Our Calculation  
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Appendix: Figure A1. Innovations of Six Variables 
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